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The Quest for Hegemony Among Countries and Global Pollution
Abstract
This paper builds on the assumption that countries behave in such a way as to improve, via
their economic strength, the probability that they will attain the hegemonic position on the
world stage. The quest for hegemony is modeled as a game, with countries being differentiated
initially only by some endowment which yields a pollution free flow of income. A country’s level
of pollution is assumed directly related to its economic strength, as measured by its level of
production. Two types of countries are distinguished: richly-endowed countries, for whom the
return on their endowment is greater than the return they can expect from winning the hegemony
race, and poorly-endowed countries, who can expect a greater return from winning the race than
from their endowment. We show that in a symmetric world of poorly-endowed countries the
equilibrium level of emissions is larger than in a symmetric world of richly-endowed countries.:
the former, being less well endowed to begin with, try harder to win the race. In the asymmetric
world composed of both types of countries, the poorly-endowed countries will be polluting more
than the richly endowed countries. Numerical simulations show that if the number of richly-
endowed countries is increased keeping the total number of countries constant, the equilibrium
level of global emissions will decrease; if the lot of the poorly-endowed countries is increased
by increasing their initial endowment keeping that of the richly-endowed countries constant,
global pollution will decrease; increasing the endowments of each type of countries in the same
proportion, and hence increasing the average endowment in that proportion, will decrease global
pollution; redistributing from the richly-endowed in favor of the poorly-endowed while keeping
the average endowment constant will in general result in an increase in the equilibrium level of
global pollution.
Keywords: Hegemony, Global pollution, Dynamic games
JEL Classification: Q54, Q50, F5
Re´sume´
Ce texte part de l’hypothe`se qu’en acque´rant plus de puissance e´conomique les pays augmentent
leur probabilite´ d’atteindre la position he´ge´monique. La queˆte a` l’he´ge´monie est mode´lise´e
comme un jeu de course ou` les joueurs sont des pays diffe´rencie´s par une dotation en capi-
tal qui ge´ne`re un flux de rendement non polluant. Le niveau d’e´mission d’un pays est suppose´
relie´ a` sa puissance e´conomique tel que mesure´e par le niveau de production. De l’analyse, deux
types de pays ressortent : les pays richement dote´s dont le rendement issu de leur dotation est
plus grand que le rendement de la re´compense en cas de succe`s dans la course a` l’he´ge´monie,
et les pays pauvrement dote´s dont le rendement de la re´compense en cas de succe`s dans cette
course est plus grand que celui du flux de rendement issu de leur dotation. Nous montrons
que dans un e´quilibre syme´trique constitue´ de pays pauvrement dote´s, le niveau d’e´quilibre des
e´missions est plus grand que celui d’un e´quilibre syme´trique constitue´ de pays richement dote´s.
Dans un monde asyme´trique constitue´ des deux types de pays, le niveau d’e´mission d’un pays
pauvrement dote´ est supe´rieur au niveau d’e´mission d’un pays richement dote´. Les simulations
nume´riques indiquent que lorsque le nombre de pays richement dote´s augmente en maintenant
fixe le nombre total de pays, alors le niveau d’e´quilibre de la pollution globale baisse ; si les do-
tations des pays pauvrement dote´s sont accrues, en laissant constante celles des pays richement
dote´s, alors la pollution globale baissera ; accroˆıtre les dotations des deux types de pays dans les
meˆmes proportions, et donc accroˆıtre la dotation moyenne dans la meˆme proportion, baissera
la pollution globale ; redistribuer des pays richement dote´s vers les pays pauvrement dote´s, tout
en maintenant fixe la dotation moyenne, re´sultera en ge´ne´ral en un accroissement du niveau
d’e´quilibre de la pollution globale.
Mots-cle´s : He´ge´monie, Pollution globale ; Jeux dynamiques
Classification JEL : Q54, Q50, F5
1 Introduction
Concerns about global pollution in general and global warming in particular have led to a
considerable body of literature. But an important question which has not yet been formally
explored has to do with the relationship between the quest for hegemony and global pollution.
Derived from the original Greek word hegemonia, which means ”leadership”, hegemony can
be seen as an institutionalized practice of special rights and responsibilities conferred on a
state with the resources to lead the international system (Clark (2009)). Most historical ages
are marked by the presence of a nation capable of dominating the course of international
politics. Over the last five centuries, Portugal, the Netherlands, France, Britain, and the
United States have played the hegemonic role Modelski (1987)).1
The quest for hegemony can be viewed as a status-seeking game among countries which
aspire to the hegemonic status and the important benefits that come with it.2 A basic
postulate widely accepted among experts of geopolitics is that relative power differences
between states cause them to compete with one another for relative shifts in power and
status. For centuries, military force was the main source of primacy in the international
system. After the cold war and the advent of nuclear warfare, military force became a
costly and risky means of attaining hegemony and economic force gained prominence as
the major factor in determining the primacy or the subordination of states.3 It is safe to
1For discussions of the quest for hegemony among countries, see also Kennedy (1987), Black (2007) and
Mosher (2000).
2Weiss and Fershtman (1980) define status as a ranking of individuals (or groups of individuals) based
on traits, assets and actions. On the subject of status seeking, see also Moldovanu et al. (2007).
3To quote the political scientist Kenneth Waltz (Waltz, 1993, p. 63 and p. 66): “Without a considerable
economic capability, no state can hope to sustain a world role, as the fate of the Soviet Union has shown.”
and “For a country to choose not to become a great power is a structural anomaly. For that reason, the
choice is a difficult one to sustain. Sooner or later, usually sooner, the international status of countries has
risen in step with their material resources. Countries with great-power economies have become great powers,
whether or not reluctantly.” Other political scientists, among them Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 1993,
p. 72), share this view: “Economic activity [. . . ] is probably the most important source of power, and
in a world in which military conflict between major states is unlikely, economic power will be increasingly
important in determining the primacy or the subordination of states.” The importance of the economic
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say that economic strength has become a necessary condition for attaining hegemony in the
international system.
After World War II, the United States, with half the world’s gross national product,
found itself in a uniquely strong position, much surpassing that of Britain at the height of
its power in the nineteenth century, and played the leading role in the international state
system. But in the last decades, the United States has been facing new global players,
such as China, India and Brazil, who are making their presence felt in international affairs,
largely due to the increasing power derived mostly from their expanding economies.4 Those
emerging economies are transforming the hegemony game into a multi-player game (Shenkar,
2005, p. 162).
But economic and ecological systems are deeply interlocked, in good part because most
of the global pollution released into the atmosphere comes from the combustion of fossil
fuels, which is a driving force of the economic system (see Stern (2007), Chombat (1998).
Raupach et al. (2007). Therefore, because economic activity impacts both global pollution
and the hegemonic game, the world can be viewed as facing a conflict between the intensity
of the hegemony game among countries and the reduction of global pollution. As has been
noted by a former Science Advisor to the U.S. President: “No realistic response to climate
change can ignore the current geopolitical preoccupation with economic competition among
nations” (Marburger, 2007, p. 5).
To analyze this issue, this paper builds on the assumption that each country behaves in
such a way as to improve, via its economic strength, the probability that it will attain the
hegemonic position on the world stage. The quest for hegemony is modeled as a game, with
countries being differentiated only by the return on some initial endowment which yields a
battle among hegemonic aspirants is also pointed out by the economist Lester Thurow (Thurow, 1993, p.
65): “Those who control the world’s largest market get to write the rules. That is as it always has been.
When the United States had the world’s largest market, it got to write the rules”
4See Shenkar (2005), Ikenberry (2008) and Elliott (2007). To quote Oded Shenkar (Shenkar, 2005, p.
38): “China’s economic aspirations are aligned strongly with its political ambitions, and the regime is aware
more than most of the close connection between the two.”
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pollution free flow of income. This return on endowment can be thought of as being related
to the country’s human capital and economic, social and political institutions. A country’s
level of pollution is assumed directly related to its economic strength, as measured by its level
of production. Two types of countries are distinguished: richly-endowed countries, for whom
the return on their endowment is greater than the return they can expect from winning the
hegemony race, and poorly-endowed countries, who can expect a greater return from winning
the race than from their endowment. As we will see, the latter, having more to gain, are
more eager players in the hegemony race and will end up polluting more in equilibrium.
The former are more content with the return they get from their endowment and end up
polluting less. We may think of emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil and Russia
as being in the category of poorly-endowed countries, whereas most North American and
Western European countries would fall in the category of richly-endowed countries.
We consider in sequence the equilibria in a world composed of only poorly-endowed coun-
tries, a world composed of only richly-endowed countries and a world in which both types
of countries coexist. We show that in a symmetric world of poorly-endowed countries the
equilibrium level of emissions is larger than in a symmetric world of richly-endowed coun-
tries: the former, being less well endowed to begin with, try harder to win the race. In
the asymmetric world composed of both types of countries, there can be multiple equilib-
ria. In all of those equilibria, the poorly-endowed countries will be polluting more than the
richly-endowed countries. Numerical simulations show that if the number of richly-endowed
countries is increased keeping the total number of countries constant, the equilibrium level
of global emissions will decrease; if the lot of the poorly-endowed countries is increased by
increasing their initial endowment keeping that of the richly-endowed countries constant,
global pollution will decrease; increasing the endowments of each type of countries in the
same proportion, and hence increasing the average endowment in that proportion, will de-
crease global pollution; redistributing from the richly-endowed in favor of the poorly-endowed
while keeping the average endowment constant will in general result in an increase in the
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equilibrium level of global pollution.
In the next section, we describe the main features of the model. Section 3 presents the
hegemony game, which borrows some of its features from the patent-race literature (Rein-
ganum (1982), Lee and Wilde (1980) and Loury (1979)). Section 4 analyzes the equilibria
under the different scenarios described above and discusses the effect of various ways of mod-
ifying the distribution of endowments in the case where poorly-endowed and richly-endowed
countries coexist. We conclude with some final remarks in Section 5.
2 The Model
Consider N countries competing to reach the hegemonic position. The probability for any
country of reaching the hegemonic position increases with its output, Qi(t), a measure of its
economic strength. Country i’s production gives rise to the emission of pollution at the rate
ei(t). For simplicity it will be assumed that one unit of production gives rise to one unit of
emission: ei(t) = Qi(t). This pollution is global, in the sense that it will affect each country
equally.
To visualize the conditions required to win the hegemony race, we can use Greek foot
races or sporting contests as analogies. The first condition to win the game is to get to the
finish line. The second condition is to be the first among all players to cross the finish line.
The prize for crossing the finish line first is greater than the prize of the losers.
In the present context, the winner gets the hegemon position and gets to enjoy “structural
power”, which Nye, Jr. (1990) called the ”soft power”. This structural power allows the
hegemon to occupy a central and prestigious position within the international system and to
play a leading role in setting standards (political, cultural, economic) in organizing the world.
We borrow from the paper of Moldovanu et al. (2007) the notion of “pure status” prize, which
is related to the notion that a contestant is happier when he has other contestants below him.
Hence the hegemon enjoys a “pure status” prize A. Any country other than the hegemon
gets a “prize” of B < A. For simplicity, A and B will be assumed constant.
4
The time it will take for country i to cross the finish line (i.e., to attain the necessary
characteristics that a country must satisfy to get the hegemonic role) is a random variable,
τi. Uncertainty about the finishing time is determined by the hazard rate Hi(t), which, by
definition, is given by:5
Hi(t) =
Pi(t < τi ≤ t+ dt)
Pi(τi > t)
.
It represents the propensity to reach the finish line at time t, given that it has not happened
before t. The hazard rate is assumed positively related to the country’s level of production,
Qi(t), and hence to its rate of pollution emissions, ei(t). It will be assumed that Hi(t) =
Qi(t) = ei(t). It follows that the probability of reaching the finish line by time t is the
cumulative distribution function Fi(t), which can be expressed, using the hazard rate, as:
Fi(t) = 1− e−
∫ t
o ei(u)du. (1)
This means that the probability of reaching the finish line by time t increases with country
i’s cumulative emissions on the interval [0, t], given by the term
∫ t
o
ei(u)du.
The first country to cross the finish line becomes the winner of this hegemony game and
obtains the prize denoted above by A. The time at which one of the countries becomes the
hegemon is a random variable and is given by
τ = min τi
i=1,...,N
.
This is the stopping time of the game. It depends stochastically on the vector (e1(t), ..., eN(t))
of emission levels by each country. Given the vector (e1(t), ..., eN(t)) of emission levels, the
instantaneous probability that country i will win the hegemony game on the infinitesimal
interval [t, t+ dt] will be given by:
F˙i(t)
N∏
j 6=i
[1− Fj(t)] dt,
5Cioffi-Revilla (1998) interprets the hazard rate as a force which, although it does not determine the
realization of a political event, acts on it by influencing its temporal evolution. In this paper, the hazard
rate consists of economic strength, a causal force arising from the country’s decisions which influences the
hegemony race.
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where F˙i(t) denotes the time derivative of Fi(t).
The instantaneous probability that country i will lose the hegemony race on the infinites-
imal interval [t, t+ dt] is the probability that one of the N − 1 other countries becomes the
winner over that interval of time. This is given by:
j=N∑
j=1,j 6=i
F˙j(t)
(
k=N∏
k=1,k 6=j
[1− Fk(t)]
)
dt.
The instantaneous probability that no country wins the hegemony game on the infinitesimal
interval of time [t, t+ dt] is:
j=N∏
j=1
[1− Fj(t)]dt.
If we denote by S(t) the stock of pollution at time t, then
S˙(t) = e1(t) + ....+ eN(t)− kS(t), S(0) = S0 > 0 given, (2)
where 0 < k < 1 is the coefficient of natural purification. Each country is assumed to suffer
equally from the global stock of pollution. The damage function is assumed to be a nonlinear
increasing and convex function of the stock, more specifically a quadratic:
Di(S(t)) =
b
2
S(t)2 (3)
with b a strictly positive constant.
It will also be assumed that the countries are differentiated solely by the return, pii,
which they get on some initial endowment. This exogenous parameter will capture the
idea of disparity between countries and the country’s pollution emissions will be assumed
independent of this permanent flow of benefits. Among the factors that can affect this
return on endowment one can think of human capital and the quality of economic, social
and political institutions.
3 The hegemony game
The hegemony game bears a lot of similarity to an R&D race, as analyzed in Reinganum
(1982), Lee and Wilde (1980) and Loury (1979). The value function of country i, i =
6
1, . . . , N , in quest of hegemony, is given by:
Vi(F1(t), ..., FN(t), S(t)) = max
ei(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
{
AF˙i(t)
∏
j 6=i
[1− Fj(t)]
+ B
∑
j 6=i
F˙j(t)
∏
k 6=j
[1− Fk(t)] + (pii −Di(S(t)))
N∏
j=1
[1− Fj(t)]
}
dt
where the maximization is subject (2) and to ei(t) ≥ 0. The stochastic variable τ having been
eliminated by formulating the objective functional in terms of expectations, this becomes
a deterministic N-player differential game, with control variables e1(t), ..., eN(t) and state
variables (F1(t), ..., FN(t), S(t)). The objective functional of country i consists of three terms.
The first reflects net benefits if the country succeeds in the quest for the hegemon’s position.
The second term is the net benefits if the country loses the quest for the hegemon position.
The third term represents the pollution damage and the payoff generated by the country’s
endowment. All three components are weighted by their respective probabilities.
In order to put the emphasis on the characterization of the hegemony game, it will
henceforth be assumed that the pollution stock is stationary and hence given by S(t) =∑N
i=1 ei(t)/k. We can therefore rewrite the damage function as D(S(t)) = β
[∑N
i=1 ei(t)
]2
/2,
where β = b/k2.
Following Dockner et al. (2000), let us now introduce the following state transformation
which will help in simplifying the formulation:
− log(1− Fi(t)) =
∫ t
o
ei(u)du ≡ Zi(t), (4)
which, upon differentiation with respect to time, gives:
Z˙i(t) = ei(t). (5)
The value function of country i can then be rewritten:
Vi(Z1(t), ..., ZN(t)) = max
ei(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−rte−
∑N
j=1 Zi(t)
Aei(t) +B∑
j 6=i
ej(t)− β
2
[
N∑
i=1
ei(t)
]2
+ pii
 dt.
where the maximization is with respect to (5).
7
Notice that although each country knows the full state vector (Z1(t), ..., ZN(t)), only
a function of it, namely the one-dimensional state variable X(t) = e−
∑N
j=1 Zi(t), is payoff
relevant.6 The problem of country i can therefore be transformed into the following one-
state variable problem:
Vi(X(t)) = max
ei(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−rtX(t)
Aei(t) +B∑
j 6=i
ej(t)− β
2
[
N∑
i=1
ei(t)
]2
+ pii
 dt (6)
where the maximization is subject to
X˙(t) = −X(t)
(
N∑
j=1
ei(t)
)
. (7)
The state variable X(t) gives the probability that the game has not yet ended at date t.
The corresponding current value Hamiltonian is given by
Hi(t) = X(t)
Aei(t) +B∑
j 6=i
ej(t)− β
2
[
N∑
i=1
ei(t)
]2
+ pii
− λi(t)[X(t)( N∑
j=1
ei(t)
)]
,
where λi(t) is the shadow value associated to the state variable X(t).
Letting θi(t) =
∑
j 6=i ej(t), that is the sum of the emission rates of country i’s rivals,
and taking into account that X(t) > 0, the following conditions, along with (7), become
necessary, for i = 1, . . . , N :
A− β[ei(t) + θi(t)]− λi(t) ≤ 0, [A− β[ei(t) + θi(t)]− λi(t)]ei(t) = 0, ei(t) ≥ 0 (8)
λ˙i(t)− rλi(t) = (ei(t) + θi(t))λi(t)−
(
Aei(t) +Bθi(t)− β
2
[ei(t) + θi(t)]
2 + pii
)
. (9)
Differentiating (8) with respect to t and substituting into (9) we get:
βE˙(t) =
β
2
E(t)2 + rβE(t)− (A−B)θi(t)− (rA− pii) (10)
where E(t) = ei(t) + θi(t). But since by assumption the stock of pollution is in a steady
state, so is E(t) and therefore E˙(t) = 0. The result is a second degree polynomial in E(t)
with roots:
E(t) = −r ±
√
r2 +
2
β
[(A−B)θi(t) + (rA− pii)]. (11)
6See Dockner et al. (2000), p. 276.
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Notice that we can without loss of generality set β = 1 and reinterpret A, B and pii as
A/β, B/β and pii/β. The discriminant is then given by:
δ(θi) = r
2 + 2[(A−B)θi + (rA− pii)].
It will be assumed strictly positive to assure distinct real roots.7 Then, neglecting the
negative root and taking into account the nonnegativity constraint on ei(t), the best response
function of country i can, at any given t, be written:
ei(θi) = max
{
0,−r − θi +
√
r2 + 2[(A−B)θi + (rA− pii)]
}
. (12)
This reaction function is not monotone. In fact, in the positive range, the second derivative
is strictly negative (since δ(θi) > 0) and hence the best response function is strictly concave
in that range and reaches a maximum for θ = [(A−B)2 − (r2 + 2(Ar − pii))] /2(A−B).
Setting −r−θi+
√
r2 + 2[(A−B)θi + (rA− pii) = 0 yields the second degree polynomial
θ2i + 2[(r − [A−B])θi − 2(Ar − pii) = 0 whose roots are given by
θi = −(r − (A−B))±
√
(r − (A−B))2 + 2(rA− pii). (13)
The product of those roots is −2(rA− pii). It follows that the roots will be of opposite sign
if rA < pii and of the same sign if rA > pii. In the latter case, since the sum of the roots is
−2(r − [A− B]), the two roots are negative if A− B < r, in which case the country would
choose ei(θi) = 0 for all θi > 0, not participating in the race for hegemony being a dominant
strategy. Both roots will be positive if A − B > r. We will assume A − B > r so that the
quest for hegemony is sufficiently attractive for the country in this situation to participate
actively in the game at least for some positive values of θi.
8 In the case where rA < pii, we
retain only the positive root, for obvious reasons.
7If δ(·) is negative, then, because of the nonnegativity constraint on ei, there still exists a solution in real
space given by ei(t) = 0 and hence E(t) = 0.
8Recall that we have earlier set β = 1, so that A−B is to be interpreted as (A−B)/β, where β = b/k2.
Hence, written β < (A − B)/r, the condition can be interpreted as: the additional value of winning the
hegemony game rather than losing it, discounted to infinity, exceeds β. The parameter β can be interpreted
as the damage cost parameter with respect to the flow of emission in steady-state, whereas b is the damage
coat parameter with respect to the stock of pollution.
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We will, from this point on, distinguish two types of countries according to their endow-
ments: pi1 and pi2 > pi1, with rA > pi1 and rA < pi2. Countries of type 1 will be called
poorly-endowed countries, in the sense that the interest flow on the hegemon’s prize exceeds
the return from its endowment; conversely, countries of type 2 are richly-endowed coun-
tries, the return on their endowment being greater than the interest flow on the payoff from
winning the quest for hegemony.
By a slight abuse of notation, we will denote by e1(t) the emissions of the typical poorly-
endowed country (type 1) and by θ1(t) the sum of the emission of that country’s rivals.
Similarly for e2(t) and θ2(t) in the case of the richly-endowed countries (type 2).
We may then write the best response to θ1 of the typical country of type 1 at any time t
as:
e1(θ1) =
{
−r − θ1 +
√
2(A−B)θ1 + r2 + 2(Ar − pi1) if θ1 ∈ [0, θ˜1)
0 if θ1 ∈ [θ˜1,+∞]
(14)
where θ˜1 is the positive root of (13). This is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The best response function of a poorly-endowed country
For this type of country, winning the hegemony game is sufficiently rewarding compared
to the return it gets from its exogenous endowment that it pays to participate actively in
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the hegemony game even for low levels of effort by all the other countries, as measured by
their emissions; hence e1(θ1 = 0) > 0. As the level of emissions of its rivals increases, its best
response is at first to increase its own level of effort and, as a result, its emissions. Beyond
some point θ˜1, it becomes optimal to reduce its emissions as the level of emissions of others
increases, until it reaches zero and remains there for all greater θ1s.
Figure 2: The best response function of a richly-endowed country
In the case of the richly-endowed countries, the best response is similar except for the
fact that the high return it gets from its endowment relative to the return from winning the
game renders it not optimal to participate actively up to some minimal level of emissions by
the other countries. Its best response as a function of θ2 is therefore:
9
e2(θ2) =

0 if θ2 ∈ [0, θ˜2]
−r − θ2 +
√
2(A−B)θ2 + r2 + 2(Ar − pi2) if θ2 ∈ (θ˜2, ˜˜θ2)
0 if θ2 ∈ [˜˜θ2,+∞]
(15)
where θ˜2 <
˜˜
θ2 are the two (positive) roots of (13). This is illustrated in Figure 2.
9In the limiting case where the discriminant of (13) is zero, θ˜2 =
˜˜
θ2 = −(r − [A − B]), which is positive
by assumption. Substituting this value for θ2 in (15), it is easily verified that e2(θ2) = 0 for all θ2 > 0: it is
optimal for the typical richly-endowed countries not to participate actively in the hegemony game no matter
what the total level of emissions of its rivals. We will assume this uninteresting case away by assuming the
discriminant of (13) to be strictly positive.
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As can be seen from (13), (14) and (15), for both types of countries, the greater the
gap (A − B) between the winner’s prize and the losers’ prize, the greater the reaction to
any given θi, and hence the greater the country’s level of emissions. Similarly for the gap
(rA−pii) between the interest flow from the hegemon’s prize and the return to the country’s
endowment. But the poorly-endowed countries, whose return on endowment is smaller than
the return to be expected from the hegemon’s prize, are more eager in the quest for hegemony
than are the richly-endowed countries. Each of them therefore reacts in a stronger fashion to
any given θi than does a richly-endowed country, so that e1(x) > e2(x) for any x < θ˜1. The
richly-endowed countries, whose return on endowment exceeds the return they can expect
on the hegemon’s prize, are more content and as a consequence react less strongly to any
given level of total effort in the quest for hegemony by their rivals.
4 The equilibrium outcomes
In this section we characterize the equilibrium solution to the hegemony game and analyze the
consequences for global pollution for, in order, a world of identical poorly-endowed countries,
a world of identical richly-endowed countries and a world composed of both poorly-endowed
and richly-endowed countries.
4.1 Equilibrium in a world of poorly-endowed countries
Consider a world where there are N identical countries of type 1 (rA > pi1) in quest of
hegemony. Then there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, given by
e∗1(N) =
−[(N − 1)(A−B)−Nr] +√[(N − 1)(A−B)−Nr]2 + 2N2(Ar − pi1)
N2
(16)
This is obtained by setting θ1 = (N − 1)e1 in (14), because of symmetry, and keeping only
the positive root of the resulting polynomial in e1.
Figure 3 illustrates this equilibrium for N = 2, given by the intersection of the reaction
function with the 45-degree line, and for N > 2, given by its intersection with the lower line
θ1/(N − 1). Since the equilibrium for N = 2 will always be in the decreasing part of the
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best response function, so will the equilibrium for all N > 2. It follows that as N increases,
e∗1(N) necessarily decreases. Indeed, from (16), it is verified that:
de∗1(N)
dN
< 0 and lim
N→∞
e∗1(N) = 0.
Hence, if we let N tend to infinity, the contribution of each individual country to global
emissions becomes negligible. However the total emissions, Ne∗1(N), are monotone increasing
and, as N tends to infinity, tend to the following positive value:
limN→∞Ne∗1(N) = −(A−B) + r +
√
(A−B)2 + r2 + 2(Ar − pi1) > 0.
Figure 3: The equilibrium with N poorly-endowed countries
4.2 Equilibrium in a world of richly-endowed countries
Consider now a world where all N countries are richly-endowed, hence of type 2 (rA < pi2).
The quest for hegemony in this case can lead to multiple symmetric equilibria.
Setting θ2 = (N − 1)e2 (by symmetry), there clearly always exists an equilibrium where
each country is content with the return from its endowment and hence does not participate
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actively in the quest for hegemony: e0∗2 (N) = 0. If the gap between the return from the
countries’ endowment and the return on the hegemony prize is sufficiently high and the
number of countries sufficiently low, this will in fact be the only equilibrium, as illustrated
in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Unique zero-emission equilibrium with N richly-endowed countries
As the gap between the return on endowment and the return on the prize falls (given the
number of countries), or as the number of countries increases (given the gap in returns), two
positive equilibria will appear in addition to the e∗2(N) = 0 equilibrium. These are given by:
ea∗2 (N) =
N [r − (A−B)] + (A−B)−√[(N − 1)(A−B)−Nr]2 + 2N2(Ar − pi2)
N2
(17)
and
eb∗2 (N) =
N [r − (A−B)] + (A−B) +√[(N − 1)(A−B)−Nr]2 + 2N2(Ar − pi2)
N2
, (18)
obtained from (15) with θ2 = (N − 1)e2. There are then three equilibria, characterized by
(e0∗2 (N), e
a∗
2 (N), e
b∗
2 (N)), with e
0∗
2 (N) and e
b∗
2 (N) being stable and e
a∗
2 (N) unstable, in the
14
sense that any small deviation will lead the system to one of the other two equilibria.10 The
unstable equilibrium ea∗2 (N) occurs in the increasing part of the best response function, while
the stable equilibrium eb∗2 (N) occurs in its decreasing part. This three equilibria situation is
illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Three equilibria with N richly-endowed countries
Like in the world of poorly-endowed countries of the previous subsection,
lim
N→∞
ea∗2 (N) = e
b∗
2 (N) = e
0∗
2 (N) = 0,
which simply means that the individual emissions become negligible as the number of coun-
tries tends to zero, as can be expected. However, in the unstable equilibrium, we now have
limN→∞Nea∗2 (N) = 0,
10A two equilibria case can also occur if the discriminant in (17) and (18) happens to be zero, so that
ea∗2 (N) and e
b∗
2 (N) coincide. This can be illustrated by the tangency of the line e2 = (1/(N − 1))θ2 and the
best response function. Of the two equilibria, only e0∗2 (N) is then stable. We will ignore this possibility in
what follows.
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so that as the number of countries tends to infinity, both the individual emissions and the
total emissions tend to zero. The stable equilibrium eb∗2 (N) has the expected property that
limN→∞Neb∗2 (N) = −(A−B) + r +
√
(A−B)2 + r2 + 2(Ar − pi2) > 0.
This expression is the same as in the case of the poorly-endowed countries, except for pi1
being replaced by pi2. Since pi2 > pi1, this positive quantity is therefore smaller than for the
poorly-endowed countries.
As can easily be seen by comparing (16) to (17) and (18), the fact that pi2 > pi1 implies
that the equilibrium individual emissions will be smaller in a richly-endowed symmetric world
than in a poorly-endowed one. This again reflects the fact that more eager poorly-endowed
countries will be making greater efforts in the quest for hegemony than more content richly-
endowed countries.
4.3 Equilibria in a world of both poorly-endowed and richly-endowed countries
A more realistic and more interesting situation is one where both poorly-endowed and richly-
endowed countries coexist. Assume now a world composed of N1 poorly-endowed countries
and N2 richly-endowed countries, with N1 + N2 = N . The configuration of the equilibria
will then depend on the distribution of countries between the two types.
From (14) and (15) we find that three types of equilibria can exist, and they may coexist.
These are
e∗1(N1, N2) =
2(N1(1−r−N1)+
√
[2(N1(1−r−N1)]2+8N1(Ar−pi1)
2N21
e∗2(N1, N2) = 0
 (19)
e∗1(N1, N2) =
−
[
2(N1+N2)(r+
N2(pi1−pi2)
A−B )−2(N1+N2−1)(A−B)
]
−
√
∆(N1,N2,pi1,pi2,A,B,r)
2(N1+N2)2
e∗2(N1, N2) = e
∗
1(N1, N2) +
pi1−pi2
A−B
 (20)
and
e∗1(N1, N2) =
−
[
2(N1+N2)(r+
N2(pi1−pi2)
A−B )−2(N1+N2−1)(A−B)
]
+
√
∆(N1,N2,pi1,pi2,A,B,r)
2(N1+N2)2
e∗2(N1, N2) = e
∗
1(N1, N2) +
pi1−pi2
A−B
 (21)
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where the ∆(N1, N2, pi1, pi2, A,B, r) is given by:
∆(N1, N2, pi1, pi2, A,B, r) =
{
2(N1 +N2)(r +
N2(pi1 − pi2)
A−B )− 2(N1 +N2 − 1)(A−B))
}2
− 4(N1 +N2)2(
[(
r +
N2(pi1 − pi2)
A−B
)2
− 2N2(pi1 − pi2)− r2 − 2(Ar − pi1)
]
.
In the equilibrium described by (19), only the poorly-endowed countries participate ac-
tively in the quest for hegemony, the richly-endowed countries being content enough with
the return from their endowment relative to the return on winning the hegemony race so as
not to participate actively. In the other two equilibria, both types of countries participate
actively in the race, but the individual emissions of the poorly-endowed countries are always
higher than those of the richly-endowed countries. Again, this reflects the greater eagerness
of the poorly-endowed countries.
Figure 6: Equilibria in a world composed of poorly-endowed and richly-endowed countries
The expression for ∆(N1, N2, pi1, pi2, A,B, r) is the discriminant of the second degree poly-
nomial obtained by substituting the best response function of the richly-endowed countries
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into that of the poorly-endowed countries in order to solve for the equilibrium emissions
of the latter. If it is strictly positive, thus eliminating complex roots, the three equilibria
can coexist. This is depicted in Figure 6 for N1 = N2 = 1. The equilibrium given by (20)
occurs in the increasing part of the two reaction functions, with the reaction function of
the poorly-endowed country cutting that of the richly-endowed country from above, and is
unstable. The other two equilibria are stable. As ∆(·) is increased there comes a point where
e1(0) > θ˜2. If ∆(·) is such that θ˜2 < e1(0) < ˜˜θ2, there is then a unique stable equilibrium
with e1 > 0 and e2 > 0, characterized by (21). If e1(0) ≥ ˜˜θ2, then the only equilibrium has
e1 > 0 and e2 = 0, characterized by (19).
If ∆(·) were negative, then, in the absence of the nonnegativity constraint on the emis-
sion rates, e1(e2) would lie everywhere above and to the left of e2(e1), there would be no
intersection between the two best response curves and hence there would be no solution in
real space. However, because of the nonnegativity constraint on e2 the two best response
functions intersect along the horizontal axis and there still exists in that case a unique stable
equilibrium in real space, characterized by (19), with 0 < e1 < θ˜2 and e2 = 0.
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The equilibrium level of global emissions is given by N1e
∗
1(N1, N2)+N2e
∗
2(N1, N2). Recall
that the date at which the new hegemon is determined and the race to hegemony ends is
τ = min{τ1, . . . , τN}. Substituting for e∗1(N1, N2) and e∗2(N1, N2) into (1), we find that in
equilibrium the probability of reaching the finish line by time t, P (τ < t), is:
F (t) = 1− e−(N1e∗1(N1,N2)+N2e2(N1,N2))t.
It follows that the expected date at which the new hegemon is determined is given by:
E(τ) = 1/(N1e
∗
1(N1, N2) +N2e2(N1, N2)).
Hence any change in the configuration of parameters (such as N1, N2, pi1 or pi2) which results
in a greater equilibrium level of global pollution, will move the expected ending date of the
11If ∆(·) = 0 we have multiple real roots. The equilibria in (20) and in (21) then coincide at the tangency
point of the two curves and the three equilibria reduce to two. The equilibrium given by (19) is then the
only stable equilibrium.
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hegemony race closer. This can be interpreted as saying that the more intense the race, the
closer the expected date at which the race is won.
A number of sensitivity analysis are of particular interest. The first one consists in simply
changing the distribution of countries between the two types, keeping the total number of
countries constant. Numerical simulations indicate that increasing the number of richly-
endowed countries while keeping N and all the other parameters except N1 constant results
in a monotonic decrease in global pollution in both of the stable equilibria.12 This makes
sense, since, as we get closer to N2 = N , we get closer to the world of richly-endowed countries
described in Subsection 4.2. Similarly, if N1 tends to N under the same conditions, the world
converges towards one of poorly-endowed countries only, as described in Subsection 4.1, and
global emissions increase as N1 increases.
A second type of sensitivity analysis consist in reducing inequalities by improving the
lot of the poorly-endowed countries without changing that of the richly-endowed countries.
This might be thought of as measures exogenous to the model that result in improvements in
the economic, political and social institutions of the poorly-endowed countries, for instance,
or in their human capital. As can be seen from (19), (20) and (21) by letting pi1 tend to pi2
with pi2 fixed, this reduces the equilibrium level of global pollution. Indeed, as pi1 approaches
pi2, e
∗
1(N1, N2) falls and approaches e
∗
2(N1, N2) and we move towards the equilibrium of a
world composed only of richly-endowed countries. At the limit, if pi1 = pi2 > rA, then
e∗1(N1, N2) = e
∗
2(N1, N2)) and the level of global pollution will be lower than when the two
types of countries coexist with pi1 < rA < pi2, since then e
∗
1(N1, N2) > e
∗
2(N1, N2)).
Alternatively, we can consider redistributing from the richly-endowed countries towards
the poorly-endowed countries by increasing pi1 while keeping constant the mean endowment
n1pi1 + n2pi2 (where ni = Ni/N) and keeping pi1 < rA < pi2, so that both types of countries
continue to coexist. This forcibly means reducing pi2 accordingly. Numerical simulations
12All the numerical simulations are done for the interior stable equilibrium characterized by (21), in which
both types of countries are polluting to begin with. This seems like the most realistic initial situation to
consider.
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show that this will result in an increase in the level of emissions of the richly-endowed
countries, who become relatively more eager in the hegemony race, and a decrease in the
level of emissions of the poorly-endowed countries, who become relatively less eager. But
the richly-endowed countries’ reaction to the fall in their endowment is stronger than that
of the poorly-endowed countries to the increase in their endowment, with the overall result
being a monotonic increase in global pollution.13
Finally, if it were possible to increase pi1, pi2 and the mean endowment in the same
proportion, global pollution would decrease monotonically as a function of that proportion:
making the whole world better endowed, so that the hegemon’s prize does not look as
attractive, would result in a reduction in global emissions. The same can be said of a
decrease in the hegemon’s prize, A.
5 Concluding remarks
We have sought to analyze the consequences for global pollution of the quest for hegemony
in a world in which economic strength, as measured by the level of economic output, drives
this quest by increasing the probability of a country becoming the new hegemon. In doing
so, we have differentiated between poorly-endowed and richly-endowed countries. The payoff
from winning the hegemony race is more attractive to the poorly-endowed countries than to
the richly-endowed countries. As a result they are more aggressive players in the quest for
hegemony and end up being bigger polluters in equilibrium. The analysis however suggests
ways in which global pollution might be reduced by acting to improve the lot the poorly-
13The starting point of the simulations is the interior stable equilibrium obtained for parameter values
A = 10, B = 3, r = 0.027, pi1 = 0.1, pi2 = 1, N = 100. The simulations were done for various values of
N1 and N2, and hence of n1pi1 + n2pi2. As long as pi1 is less than rA = 0.27, global pollution increases
monotonically with pi1. When pi1 exceeds 0.27, all countries become richly-endowed, although unequally so
as long as pi1 6= pi2, and we would have an asymmetric equilibrium in a world of richly-endowed countries.
Continuing to redistribute in this way from pi2 towards pi1 beyond this point will continue to increase pollution
over some positive interval. But, if we push this redistribution far enough, at some point, if all countries feel
sufficiently rich, they will drop out of the race and the world moves to a zero-emissions equilibrium. When
this may happen will of course depend, among other things, on the values of (N1, N2) and of pi2.
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endowed countries without impacting directly on the richly-endowed. These would seem to
rest on measures designed to improve the major factors that determine the return from their
endowment, such as their human capital and their economic, social and political institutions.
In order to emphasize the role of the relative return from initial endowments, we have
assumed that it is the only distinguishing factor between countries. In further analysis, one
might want to explicitly take into account other distinguishing factors, such as the size of
the countries, as measured by their population for instance. There is however no reason to
believe that this would change the qualitative results of our analysis.
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